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Therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) identifies how parties in cases
before courts may be helped or hurt in their recovery by the legal
process itself.' Procedures crafted to take problems faced by parties
into consideration may actually aid the process of recovery.2 Most TJ
research has focused on trial courts, attempting to measure the impact
on actual parties to particular pieces of litigation. Professor Nathalie
Des Rosiers has recently shifted the focus to appellate courts, arguing
that how an appellate court frames its decision may significantly
impact persons who are not parties to the case at bar.3 Her analysis is
both creative and original.
This Article will suggest that TJ has occasionally been part of the
United States Supreme Court's jurisprudence. The Court sometimes
finds itself at the center of deeply-divisive national controversies. On
those occasions, the opinion of the Court can, and ought to, play a role
in healing the nation's controversy-inflicted wounds. The Court
should consciously craft an opinion that speaks to the American peo-
ple as a whole and that calls on every citizen, regardless of the fervency
of his or her beliefs, to accept the resolution of the controversy offered
by the Court. During such crises, citizens are unlikely to accept solu-
tions crafted by elected officials, whom they rightly judge to be parti-
san politicians. The Court's removal from the political process allows
it an opportunity to have a therapeutic role in healing the nation's
wounds. I shall focus on two decisions: (1) Brown v. Board of Educa-
tion of Topeka,4 the Supreme Court's seminal decision holding that
state segregation of students by race in public schools violates the
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Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection clause; and (2) Planned
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,' the Court's impor-
tant decision reaffirming a woman's right to choose.
In 1896, in Plessy v. Ferguson,6 the Supreme Court created the
separate-but-equal doctrine, which allowed segregated facilities to
exist as long as they were equal.7 This doctrine was subsequently used
to uphold segregated schools.' The separate-but-equal doctrine con-
trolled until the 1940s, when the NAACP Legal and Educational
Defense Fund began an attack upon segregation in public institu-
tions.9 Between 1938 and 1952, the edifice of separate-but-equal
began to crumble as the Court, in a series of rulings, struck down
aspects of racial segregation."0 Nonetheless, the doctrine remained
strong in the public school system." Dismantling this system of racial
separation was not something that could be done easily or quickly by
federal judges sitting in Washington, D.C. 2 It would take deliberatd
decisions by local officials making nuanced, fact-specific choices in
thousands of school districts around the country.' 3
In May 1954, Chief Justice Earl Warren issued the Court's
unanimous opinion in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka.14 For
such a momentous decision, the opinion is rather commonplace.
Warren began by suggesting that the history of racial segregation was
inconclusive in terms of the intent of the framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.'5  Relying on "modern
authority," he then noted the changing status of public education in
American life, observing that education plays an incredibly important
role.' 6 Finally, Warren concluded that "[s]eparate educational facili-
ties are inherently unequal."' 7 The Court did not hold that all racial
lines are impermissible, but rather that there is "no place" in public
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education for separate educational facilities.'" The Court ordered
further argument on what remedy should be forthcoming."
Academics have soundly criticized the Brown opinion on a
number of grounds, including its monumental ambiguity.2 ° In my
opinion, the Brown opinion is subject to at least four different inter-
pretations. First, it might stand for the proposition that the state must
integrate its public facilities, especially schools. Second, Brown can be
read as endorsing the proposition that the state has to provide an equal
education, which cannot happen in a segregated setting. Third, Brown
might stand for the proposition that the Constitution prohibits state
sponsored segregation. Finally, Brown might prohibit state actions
that stigmatize African Americans.
In the aftermath of Brown, a veritable cottage industry of aca-
demic critics, in law as well as in other disciplines, dissected the opin-
ion and found it wanting on a number of grounds. First, the Court's
reliance upon "modern authority" embraced social science studies that
were quite rudimentary.2' Placing a constitutional ruling on such a
base leaves open the possibility that the ruling could be reversed if
new sociological studies reveal different psychological consequences of
segregation.22 Other critics have lambasted Brown's understanding of
the original intent of the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Given the segregationist attitudes of the 1860s, these critics have
attacked Brown as inconsistent with the original intent of the framers.24
Still other critics have suggested that there is a problem with claiming
that separate-but-equal is inherently unequal.25 If schools are truly
equal in terms of their resources, why is the education unequal? Does
Brown imply that African Americans need the presence of whites to
learn at a high level? Along these lines, perhaps the most severe critic
has been Professor Herbert Wechsler of Columbia Law School who,
in a famous essay, called for the Court to use "neutral principles" of
constitutional law, ones that would transcend the result in the case at
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bar.26 To him, if the schools were indeed equal in resources and facil-
ities, then the Constitution's concept of equality was not violated.
2 7
There is much force to these academic criticisms. Brown is not a
particularly strong legal opinion. Chief Justice Warren could have
made a more powerful argument for ending racial segregation in pub-
lic schools. First, he might have begun by chronicling the history of
the Reconstruction Amendments with their promise of providing full
citizenship to all persons born in the United States. He also could
have considered the extensive list of Supreme Court decisions that
struck down various aspects of race discrimination or segregation.
Instead, the opinion is rather casual and cursory in this regard. An
extensive explanation of these decisions would have demonstrated that
Brown was simply the natural consequence of following these earlier
rulings. Third, Chief Justice Warren might have examined the his-
tory of the actual administration of the separate-but-equal doctrine by
local governments. That history would have demonstrated that while
the schools were always separate, they were never equal.2 Also, he
might have reasoned that it would be futile to adhere to a doctrine that
had never been realistically enforced. As a consequence, only an abso-
lute ban on separate-but-equal would be an adequate response.
Finally, he might have gone back to Plessy v. Ferguson, the root of the
separate-but-equal doctrine, and critiqued the Court's rationale in that
case. Plessy was a rather feeble ruling, and I shall not belabor this
essay by deconstructing it.29 I will let it suffice to say, dismantling it
would be an easy task.
Chief Justice Warren did none of. these things. If he had, it
would have produced a more powerful, persuasively reasoned legal
document. It might have succeeded in quieting academic criticism.
But Warren intentionally and consciously rejected this approach.
When Warren circulated his initial draft of the opinion for the Court,
he appended to it a memorandum in which he explained to his fellow
Justices that the drafts "were prepared on the theory that the opinions
should be short, readable by the lay public, non-rhetorical, unemo-
tional and, above all, non-accusatory."3  This quotation offers a
remarkable commentary on who Chief Justice Warren considered to
be the audience for his opinion and on how he hoped that the opinion
would be received. He aspired not to generate the acclaim of legal aca-
26. Id. at 19.
27. See id. at 34.
28. See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 88 (1975).
29. For a critique of Plessy, see Robert J. Glennon, Jr., Justice Henry Billings Brown: Values
in Tension, 44 U. COLO. L. REV. 553, 589-90 (1973).
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demics, but to produce an opinion that would be accepted by the
nation as a whole and that would pave the way for dismantling state-
sponsored segregation of public schools.
Warren could easily have written an opinion full of righteous
indignation at the hypocrisy and mean spiritedness of a separate-but-
equal division of people based solely on the color of their skin. But
such an opinion might have alienated his three southern colleagues
and led them to withhold approval or even to dissent. A splintered
Supreme Court might have had less legitimacy in the eyes of the South
which, after all, would be required ultimately to implement the
Court's ruling. Equally as important, such an opinion might have
stirred up the passions of the white South and led to even greater
resistance than that which ultimately developed. Rather than casting
stones at the immorality or oppression of segregation, Warren chose to
emphasize the critical role of education in a democratic society. "[I]t
is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in
life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportu-
nity, where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right that must
be made available to all on equal terms."3'
Recent decades have witnessed a significant change in the nature
of the people appointed to the Supreme Court; this change may make
it more difficult for the current Court, on that rare occasion, to reach
out to the nation as a whole. The Court that decided Brown included
Earl Warren, former Governor of California, Robert Jackson, former
Attorney General of the United States, William 0. Douglas, former
Chair of the Securities and Exchange Commission, and Hugo Black,
former United States Senator from Alabama. These men had experi-
ence in public affairs and a great sensitivity to the nation's pulse.
Recently, almost no one has been appointed to the Court who was not
sitting as a lower federal court judge at the time of appointment. Some
of them, like Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg, were formerly
law professors. Law professors and judges are two groups not exactly
known for having their fingers on the pulse of the people. Reclusive,
arrogant, and detached are more common descriptions of professors
and judges. Over the last several decades, Supreme Court decisions
have become increasingly splintered, with larger numbers of concur-
rences and pluralities. In some cases, it takes a score card to under-
stand whether there are four or five Justices providing a majority for
sections of particular opinions. There has been an equally disturbing
decline in civility, leading to sharp barbs and occasional ad hominem
attacks on fellow Justices, such as when Justice Scalia wrote that a par-
31. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
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ticular opinion of Justice O'Connor "[could not] be taken seriously." ,32
Many recent Supreme Court decisions have been framed much as a
college debater might structure an argument: full of rhetorical points
aimed at winning an argument. As in Brown, what these opinions lack
is a sense that the Supreme Court's audience is not simply the profes-
sional bench and bar. The audience includes not only policy makers
and office holders, but also citizens of the entire country.
Even with these changes, the Supreme Court, on occasion, speaks
with a voice that aims at a national audience. An example is the re-
markable decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania
v. Casey.33 Faced with the question of whether to overrule its seminal
right to choose decision, Roe v. Wade,34 the Court instead reaffirmed
"the essential holding" of Roe.35 This came as quite a surprise to
many observers. After all, the Republican Party had controlled the
White House for all but four years since the initial decision in Roe in
1973. Each presidential campaign had made the Court a political
issue and Republican presidents had appointed eight of the nine then-
current Justices. Yet, in a remarkable display of judicial statesman-
ship, Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter combined to author a
joint opinion-only the second time in the history of the Court that
the Court's opinion was written by more than a single individual.36
From the opinion's opening sentence, "Liberty finds no refuge in a
jurisprudence of doubt, '37 one knew this was no ordinary judicial
opinion. The Court emphasized the historic development of liberty
and placed special emphasis on the unique situation in which a preg-
nant woman finds herself.38 A woman who carries a child to full term
faces anxieties, physical constraints, and pain that only she must
bear.39 The Casey joint opinion limited the state from displacing the
woman's choice over such a personal decision.4°
The Casey joint opinion made a bridge with Brown in consider-
ing the circumstances under which the Court ought to overrule earlier
precedent. The joint opinion reasoned that when the Court decides a
32. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 532 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing).
33. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
34. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
35. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
36. The other case written by more than one justice is Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958),
the Little Rock school desegregation case in which all nine Justices signed the opinion of the
Court.
37. Casey, 505 U.S. at 844.
38. See id. at 852.
39. Id.
40. See id. at 833-901.
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case that involves an "intensely divisive controversy,"41 as in Roe, its
decision carries substantial weight because, under our Constitution,
the Court's interpretation of the Constitution requires both sides to a
national controversy to accept the common mandate of the Court's
interpretation. According to the joint opinion, the Court "is not
asked to do this very often, having thus addressed the Nation only
twice in our lifetime, in the decisions of Brown and Roe."43 To over-
rule Roe in the face of controversy would subvert the Court's legiti-
macy.44 The joint opinion refused to do so.4 In conclusion, the joint
opinion observed that "[o]ur Constitution is a covenant running from
the first generation of Americans to us and then to future genera-
tions."46
Based on this covenant, the Court, as in Brown, once again
reached out to the country at large and asked it to accept Roe as the
law of the land. In Casey, the joint opinion appealed not only to the
professional audience of lawyers, judges, and elected officials around
the country. The Court also sought to reach the nation as a whole,
particularly citizens who did not agree with the Court's original
decision in Roe. It hoped to placate division by appealing to the need
to settle an "intensely divisive controversy" through the rule of law
and by recognizing the critical place of liberty under the Constitution.
Brown and Casey illustrate a Supreme Court conscious of an
audience beyond lawyers and judges. These decisions are powerful
judicial opinions, not because of the force of their legal arguments, but
because they epitomize the leadership role that the Supreme Court can
play during moments of great controversy. The impact of a judicial
decision may extend far beyond the parties to the actual case. If
appellate courts are to persuade citizens at large to abide by partic-
ularly unpopular rulings, courts must draft their opinions mindful that
the concerns of a lay audience are equally as important as those of the
professional audience. Appellate judges must ground their opinions
not simply in the technicalities of legal jargon, but more broadly in the
principles of constitutionalism that expect citizens to abide by laws
and judicial opinions with which they disagree. Casey's metaphor of
the Constitution as a covenant asks citizens to obey the law (i.e., the
Court's ruling in Casey) because, as citizens, they have a stake in the
rule of law. Under American constitutionalism, appellate opinions
41. Id. at 866.
42. Id. at 866-67.
43. Id. at 867.
44. Id. at 867.
45. Id. at 868-69.
46. Id. at 901.
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provide a remarkable forum for educating the public about the
structure and processes of government and about rights and responsi-
bilities. If appellate judges do not consider the lay public as they craft
their opinions, they squander an opportunity to deepen citizens'
knowledge of democratic institutions and the rule of law.
